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Abstract
We present six multiparty protocols with information-theoretic security that tolerate an arbi-
trary number of corrupt participants. All protocols assume pairwise authentic private channels
and a broadcast channel (in a single case, we require a simultaneous broadcast channel). We
give protocols for veto, vote, anonymous bit transmission, collision detection, notification and
anonymous message transmission. Not assuming an honest majority, in most cases, a single
corrupt participant can make the protocol abort. All protocols achieve functionality never ob-
tained before without the use of either computational assumptions or of an honest majority.
Keywords: multiparty computation, anonymous message transmission, election protocols, col-
lision detection, dining cryptographers, information-theoretic security.
1 Introduction
In the most general case, multiparty secure computation enables n participants to collaborate to
compute an n-input, n-output function (one per participant). Each participant only learns his
private output which, depending on the function, can be the same for each participant. Assuming
that private random keys are shared between each pair of participants, we known that every function
can be securely computed in the presence of an active adversary if and only if less than n/3
participants are corrupt; this fundamental result is due to Michael Ben-Or, Shafi Goldwasser and
Avi Wigderson [BGW88] and David Chaum, Claude Cre´peau and Ivan Damg˚ard [CCD88]. When
a broadcast channel is available, the results of Tal Rabin and Michael Ben-Or [RB89] tell us that
this proportion can be improved to n/2.
Here, we present six specific multiparty computation protocols that achieve correctness and
privacy without any assumption on the number of corrupt participants. Naturally, we cannot
always achieve the ideal functionality, for example in some cases, a single participant can make the
protocol abort. This is the price to pay to tolerate an arbitrary number of corrupt participants and
still provide information-theoretic privacy of the inputs.
All protocols we propose have polynomial complexity in the number of participants and the
security parameter. We always assume pairwise shared private random keys between each pair
of participants, which allows pairwise private authentic channels. We also assume a broadcast
channel and, even though it is a strong assumption, in some cases we need the broadcast to be
simultaneous [CGMA85, HM05].
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1.1 Summary of results
Our main contributions are in the areas of elections (vote) and anonymity (anonymous bit trans-
mission and anonymous message transmission). Each protocol is an astute combination of basic
protocols, which are also of independent interest, and that implement parity, veto, collision detec-
tion and notification.
The main ingredient for our information-theoretically secure protocols is the dining cryptog-
raphers protocol [Cha88] (see also Section 2), to which we add the following simple yet powerful
observation: if n participants each hold a private bit of an n-bit string with Hamming weight of
parity p, then any single participant can randomize p by locally flipping his bit with a certain
probability. It is impossible, however, for any participant to locally derandomize p. In the case
of the anonymous message transmission, we also build on the dining cryptographers protocol by
noting that a message that is sent can be ciphered with a one-time pad by having one participant
(the receiver) broadcast a random bit. Any modification of the message can then be detected by
the receiver with an algebraic manipulation detection code [CFP07].
1.1.1 Vote
Our vote protocol (Section 4) allows n participants to conduct anm-candidate election. The privacy
is perfect but the protocol has the drawback that if it aborts (any corrupt participant can cause an
abort), the participants can still learn information that would have been available had the protocol
succeeded. For this protocol, we require a simultaneous broadcast channel. It would be particularly
well-suited for a small group of voters that are unwilling to trust any third party and who have no
advantage in making the protocol abort.
Previous work on information-theoretically secure voting protocols include [CFSY96], where a
protocol is given in the context where many election authorities are present. To the best of our
knowledge, our approach is fundamentally different from any other approaches for voting. It is the
first to provide information-theoretic security without requiring or trusting any third party, while
also providing ballot casting assurance (each participant is convinced that their input is correctly
recorded [AN06]) and universal verifiability (each participant is conviced that only registered voters
cast ballots and that the tally is correctly computed [SK95]).
1.1.2 Anonymity
Anonymity is the power to perform a task without having to identify the participants that are
involved. In the case of anonymous message transmission, it is simply the capacity of the sender
to transmit a private message to a specific receiver of his choosing without revealing either his
identity or the identity of the receiver. A number of protocols have been suggested for anonymous
transmission. Many of these rely on trusted or semi-trusted third parties as well as computational
assumptions (for instance, the MIX-net [Cha81]). Here, we do not make any such assumptions.
The most notable protocol for anonymous transmission in our context is the dining cryptogra-
pher’s protocol [Cha88], which allows a single sender to anonymously broadcast a bit, and provides
information-theoretical security against a passive adversary. We present the protocol in a version
that implements the multiparty computation of the parity function in Section 2.
The case of multiple yet honest senders in the dining cryptographer’s protocol can be solved
by time slot reservation techniques, as originally noted by Chaum [Cha88]. But nevertheless, any
corrupt participant can jam the channel. Techniques offering computational security to this problem
have been proposed [Cha88, WP89b]. Also, computational assumptions allow the removal of the
reliance on a broadcast channel [WP89a].
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In our implementation of anonymous bit transmission (Section 5), we elegantly deal with the
case of multiple senders by allowing an unlimited amount of participants to act as anonymous
senders. Each anonymous sender can target any number of participants and send them each a
private bit of his choice. Thus, the outcome of the protocol is, for each participant, a private list
indicating how many 0s and how many 1s were received. The anonymity of the sender and receiver
and the privacy of all transmitted bits is always perfectly achieved, but any participant can cause
the protocol to abort, in which case the participants may still learn some information about their
own private lists.
We need a way for all participants to find out if the protocol has succeeded. This is done with
the veto protocol (Section 3), which takes as input a single bit from each participant; the output of
the protocol is the logical OR of the inputs. Our implementation differs from the ideal functionality
since a participant that inputs 1 will learn if some other participant also input 1. We make use of
this deviation from the ideal functionality in further protocols.
In our fixed role anonymous message transmission protocol (Section 8), we present a method
which allows a single sender to communicate a message of arbitrary length to a single receiver. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first protocol ever to provide perfect anonymity, message
privacy and integrity. For a fixed security parameter, the anonymous message transmission is
asymptotically optimal.
Our final protocol for anonymous message transmission (Section 9) allows a sender to send
a message of arbitrary length to a receiver of his choosing. While any participant can cause the
protocol to abort, the anonymity of the sender and receiver is always perfectly achieved. The
privacy of the message is preserved except with exponentially small probability. As far as we are
aware, all previous proposed protocols for this task require either computational assumptions or
a majority of honest participants. The protocol deals with the case of multiple senders by first
executing the collision detection protocol (Section 6), in which each participant inputs a single bit.
The outcome only indicates if the sum of the inputs is 0, 1 or more. Compared to similar protocols
called time slot reservation [Cha88, WP89b], our protocol does not leak any additional information
about the number of would-be senders. The final protocol also makes use of the notification protocol
(Section 7) in which each participant chooses a list of other participants that are to be notified.
The output privately reveals to each participant the logical OR of his received notifications. A
special case of this protocol is when a single participant notifies another single participant; this is
the version used in our final protocol to enable the sender to anonymously tell to the receiver to
act accordingly.
1.2 Common features to all protocols
All protocols presented in the following sections share some common features, which we now de-
scribe. Our protocols are given in terms of multiparty computation with inputs and outputs and
involve n participants, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n. In the ideal functionality, the only information that
the participants learn is their output (and what can be deduced from it). Correctness refers to
the fact that the outputs are correctly computed, while privacy ensures that the inputs are never
revealed.
The protocols ensure correctness and privacy even in the presence of an unlimited number of
misbehaving participants. Two types of such behaviour are relevant: participants who collude
(they follow the protocol but pool their information in order to violate the protocol’s privacy), and
participants who actively deviate from the protocol (in order to violate the protocol’s correctness
or privacy). Without loss of generality, these misbehaviours are modelled by assuming a central
adversary that controls some participants, rendering them corrupt. The adversary is either passive
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(it learns all the information held by the corrupt participants), or active (it takes full control of
the corrupt participants). We will deal only with the most general case of active adversaries, and
require them to be static (the set of corrupt participants does not change). A participant that is
not corrupt is called honest. Our protocols are such that if they do not abort, there exists inputs
for the corrupt participants that would lead to the same output if they were to act honestly. If a
protocol aborts, the participants do not learn any more information than they could have learned
in an honest execution of the protocol. The input and output description applies only to honest
participants.
We assume that each pair of participants shares a private, uniformly random string that can
be used to implement an authentic private channel. The participants have access to a broadcast
channel and in some cases, it is simultaneous. A broadcast channel is an authentic broadcast channel
for which the sender is confident that all participants receive the same value and the receivers know
the identity of the sender. A simultaneous broadcast channel is a collection of broadcast channels
where the input of one participant cannot depend on the input of any other participant. This
could be achieved if all participants simultaneously performed a broadcast. In order to distinguish
between the two types of broadcast, we sometimes call the broadcast channel a regular broadcast.
It is not uncommon in multiparty computation to allow additional resources, even if these resources
cannot be implemented with the threshold on the honest participants (the results of [RB89] which
combine a broadcast channel with n/2 honest participants being the most obvious example). Our
work suggests that a simultaneous broadcast channel is an interesting primitive to study in this
context.
In all protocols, the security parameter is s. Unfortunately, in many of our protocols, a single
corrupt participant can cause the protocol to abort. All protocols run in polynomial time with
respect to the number of participants, the security parameter and the input length. Although some
of the protocols presented in this paper are efficient, our main focus here is in the existence of
protocols for the described tasks. We leave for future work improvement of their efficiency. Finally,
due to lack of space, we present only sketches of security proofs.
2 Parity
Protocol 1 implements the parity function and is essentially the same as the dining cryptographers
protocol [Cha88], with the addition of a simultaneous broadcast channel. Note that if we used a
broadcast channel instead, then the last participant to speak would have the unfair advantage of
being able to adapt his input in order to fix the outcome of the protocol!
Correctness and privacy follows from [Cha88]. Thus, any adversary can learn only what can
be deduced from the corrupt participant’s inputs and the outcome of the protocol. Note that this
means that the adversary can deduce the parity of the inputs of the other participants. We will
later use the two simple observations that there is no way to cheat except by refusing to broadcast
and that any value that is broadcast is consistent with a choice of valid inputs. In the following
protocols, we will adapt step 4 of the parity protocol to make it relevant to the scenario, this will
allow us to remove the assumption of the simultaneous broadcast. We will also use the fact that if a
single participant either does not broadcast, or broadcasts a random bit in step 4 then the value of
the output of parity is known to this participant, but is perfectly hidden to all other participants.
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Protocol 1 Parity
Input: xi ∈ {0, 1}
Output: yi = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn
Broadcast type : simultaneous broadcast
Achieved functionality:
1) (Correctness) If the protocol does not abort, the output is the same as in the ideal functionality.
2) (Privacy) No adversary can learn more than the output of the ideal functionality.
Each participant i does the following:
1. Select uniformly at random an n-bit string ri = r
1
i r
2
i . . . r
n
i with Hamming weight of parity xi.
2. Send rji to participant j using the private channel; keep bit r
i
i to yourself.
3. Compute zi, the parity of the sum of all the bits received, including r
i
i.
4. Use the simultaneous broadcast channel to announce zi.
5. After the simultaneous broadcast is finished, compute yi =
⊕n
k=1 zk. This is the outcome of
the protocol. If the simultaneous broadcast fails, abort the protocol.
3 Veto
In this section, we build on the parity protocol to give a protocol for the secure implementation
of the veto function, which computes the logical OR of the participant’s inputs (Protocol 2). We
also discuss some important deviations from the ideal functionality.
Protocol 2 Veto
Input: xi ∈ {0, 1}
Output: yi = x1 ∨ x2 ∨ · · · ∨ xn
Broadcast type : regular broadcast
Achieved functionality:
1) (Reliability) No participant can make the protocol abort.
2) (Correctness) The outcome of the protocol equals the outcome of the ideal functionality.
3) (Privacy) Any adversary learns what it would have learned in the ideal functionally, had the
corrupt participants used 0 as input, but nothing more.
The n participants agree on n orderings such that each ordering has a different last participant.
result← 0
For each ordering,
Repeat s times:
1. Each participant i sets the value of pi in the following way: if xi = 0 then pi = 0; otherwise,
pi = 1 with probability
1
2 and pi = 0 with complimentary probability.
2. The participants execute the parity protocol with inputs p1, p2, . . . pn, with the exception
that the simultaneous broadcast is replaced by a regular broadcast with the participants
broadcasting according to the current ordering (if any participant refuses to broadcast, set
the value result← 1). If the outcome of parity is 1, then set result← 1 .
Output the value result.
Lemma 3.1. (Reliability) No participant can make the veto protocol abort.
Proof. If a participant refuses to broadcast, it is assumed that the output of the protocol is 1.
Lemma 3.2. (Correctness) If all participants in the veto protocol have input xi = 0, then the
protocol achieves the ideal functionality with probability 1. If there exists a participant with input
xi = 1 then the protocol is correct with probability at least 1− 2
−s.
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Proof. The correctness follows by the properties of the parity protocol, with the difference that
we now have a broadcast channel instead of a simultaneous broadcast channel. The case where
all inputs are 0 is trivial. Let xi = 1 and suppose that the protocol is executed until the ordering
in which participant i speaks last. Then with probability at least 1 − 2−s, in step 2 of veto, the
output of the protocol will be set to 1.
Lemma 3.3. (Privacy) In the veto protocol, the most an adversary can learn is the information
that it could have learned by assigning to all corrupt participants the input 0. Additionally, this
information is revealed, even to a passive adversary, with probability at least 1− 2−s.
Proof. This follows from the properties of the parity protocol: for a given repetition, the adversary
learns the parity of the honest participants’ pi’s, but nothing else. Because of the way that the
pi’s are chosen in step 1, if for any repetition, this parity is odd, the adversary concludes that at
least one honest participant has input 1, and otherwise if all repetitions yield 0, then the adversary
concludes that with probability at least 1 − 2−s, all the honest participant’s inputs are 0. In all
cases, this is the only information that is revealed; clearly, it is revealed to any passive adversary,
except with exponentially small probability.
4 Vote
The participants now wish to conduct an m-candidate vote. The idea of Protocol 3 is simple. In
the veto protocol, each participant with input 1 completely randomizes his input into the parity
protocol, thus randomizing the output of parity. By flipping the output of parity with probability
only 1/n, the probability of the outcome being odd becomes a function of the number of such flips.
Using repetition, this probability can be approximated to obtain the exact number of flips with
exponentially small error probability. This can be used to compute the number of votes for each
candidate. Unfortunately, a corrupt participant can randomize his bit with probability higher
than 1/n, enabling him to vote more than once. But since a participant cannot derandomize the
parity, he cannot vote less than zero times. Verifying that the sum of the votes equals n ensures
that all participants vote exactly once. Note that the protocol we present is polynomial in m and
not in the length of m.
Lemma 4.1. (Correctness) If the vote does not abort, then there exists an input for each corrupt
participant such that the output of the honest participants equals the output of the ideal functionality,
except with probability exponentially small in s.
Proof. If all participants are honest, the correctness of the protocol is derived from the Chernoff
bound as explained in the Appendix. Assume now t corrupt participants. Since the parity protocol
is perfect, the only place participant i can deviate from the protocol is by choosing pi with an
inappropriate probability. We first note that if the t corrupt participants actually transmit the
correct number of private bits in phase A and broadcast the correct number of bits in phase B,
then whatever they actually send is consistent with some global probability of flipping.
We use again the fact that it is possible to randomize the parity but not to derandomize it: if
the corrupt participants altogether flip with a probability not consistent with an integer number of
votes, either the statistics will be inconsistent, causing the protocol to abort, or we can interpret
the results as being consistent with an integer amount of votes. If they flip with a probability
consistent with an integer different than t, then each y[k]i will be assigned a value, but with
probability exponentially close to 1, we will have
∑m
k=1 y[k]i 6= n and the protocol will abort.
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Protocol 3 Vote
Input: xi ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
Output: for k = 1 to m, y[k]i = |{xj | xj = k}|
Broadcast type : simultaneous broadcast
Achieved functionality:
1) (Correctness) If the protocol does not abort, then there exists an input xi for each corrupt
participant such that the protocol achieves the ideal functionality.
2) (Privacy) Even if the protocol aborts, no adversary can learn more that what it would have
learned by setting in the ideal functionality xi = 1 for all corrupt participants.
Phase A
For each candidate k = 1 to m,
For j = 1 to s,
1. Each participant i sets the value of pi in the following way: if xi 6= k, then pi = 0; otherwise,
pi = 1 with probability
1
n
and pi = 0 with complimentary probability.
2. The participants execute the parity protocol to compute the parity of p1, p2, . . . pn, but
instead of broadcasting their output bit zi, they store it as z[k]
j
i .
Phase B
All participants simultaneously broadcast z[k]ji (j = 1, 2, . . . , s). If the simultaneous broadcast is
not successful, the protocol aborts.
Phase C
To compute the tally, y[k]i, for each value k = 1 . . . m, each participant sets: p[k]j =
⊕n
i=1 z[k]
j
i ,
σ[k]i =
∑s
j=1 p[k]j/s and if there exists an integer v such that |σ[k]i − pv| <
1
2e2n
,
where pv =
1
2
(
n−2
n
)v (( n
n−2
)v
− 1
)
, then y[k]i = v .
If for any m, no such value v exists, or if
∑m
k=1 y[k]i 6= n, the protocol aborts.
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Lemma 4.2. (Privacy) In the vote protocol, no adversary can learn more than what it would have
learned by assigning to all corrupt participants the input 1 in the ideal functionality, and this even
if the protocol aborts.
Proof. Assume that the first t participants are corrupt. No information is sent phase A or
phase C. We thus have to concentrate on phase B where the participants broadcast their in-
formation regarding each parity. For each execution of parity, the adversary learns the parity
of the honest participant’s values, pt+1 ⊕ pt+2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ pn, but no information on these individual
values is revealed. The adversary can thus only evaluate the probability with which the other
participants have flipped the parity. But this information could be deduced from the output of the
ideal functionality, for instance by fixing the corrupt participants’ inputs to 1.
It is important to note that the above results do not exclude the possibility of an adversary
causing the protocol to abort while still learning some information as stipulated in Lemma 4.2. This
information could be used to adapt the behaviour of the adversary in a future execution of vote.
In addition to the above theorems, it follows from the use of the simultaneous broadcast channel
that an adversary cannot act in a way that a corrupt participant’s vote depends an honest par-
ticipant’s vote. In particular, it cannot duplicate an honest participant’s vote. We claim that our
protocol provides ballot casting assurance and universal verifiability. This is straightforward from
the fact that participants do not entrust any computation to a third party: they provide their own
inputs and can verify that the final outcome is computed correctly.
5 Anonymous Bit Transmission
The anonymous bit transmission protocol enables a sender to privately and anonymously trans-
mit one bit to a receiver of his choice. Protocol 4 actually deals with the usually problematic scenario
of multiple anonymous senders in an original way: it allows an arbitrary number participants to
act as anonymous senders, each one targeting any number of participants and sending them each a
chosen private bit. Each participant is also simultaneously a potential receiver : at the end of the
protocol, each participant has a private account of how many anonymous senders sent the bit 0
and how many sent the bit 1. Note that in our formalism for multiparty computation, the privacy
of the inputs implies the anonymity of the senders and receivers.
The security of the anonymous bit transmission protocol follows directly from the security
of the vote and of the veto. Of course, the anonymous bit transmission also inherits the
drawbacks of these protocols. More precisely we have the following:
Lemma 5.1. (Correctness) The anonymous bit transmission protocol computes the correct
output, except with exponentially small probability.
Proof. If the protocol does not abort, by Lemmas 3.2 and 4.1, except with exponentially small
probability, all bits are correctly transmitted.
Lemma 5.2. (Privacy) In the anonymous bit transmission protocol, the privacy is the same
as in the ideal functionality.
Proof. Each execution of the vote protocol provides perfect privacy, even if the protocol aborts.
The final veto reveals some partial information about which honest participants have been targeted
by corrupt participants, but this does not compromise the privacy of the protocol.
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Protocol 4 Anonymous Bit Transmission
Input: xji ∈ {0, 1,⊥}, (j = 1, 2, . . . , n)
Output: yi = (|{x
i
j | x
i
j = 0}|, |{x
i
j | x
i
j = 1}|)
Broadcast type : regular broadcast
1) (Correctness) If the protocol does not abort then the output of the protocol equals the output
of the ideal functionality.
2) (Privacy) The privacy is the same as in the ideal functionality.
For each participant j,
1. Execute the vote protocol with m = 3 as modified below. The three choices are: 0, 1, or
⊥ (abstain). Each participant i chooses his input to the vote according to xji , his choice of
message to be sent anonymously to participant j. The vote protocol is modified such that:
(a) The output strings are sent to participant j through the private channel.
(b) Participant j computes the tally as in the vote and if this computation succeeds, he
finds out how many participants sent him a 0, how many sent him a 1 and how many
abstained. If this occurs (and the results are consistent) he sets his success bit, sj to 0.
If the vote aborts, he sets sj to 1.
Execute the veto protocol, using as inputs the success bits sj. If the output of veto is 0, then the
anonymous bit transmission succeeds. Otherwise, the protocol fails.
In Protocol 4, the use of the private channel in step (a) can be removed and replaced by a
broadcast channel. Since participant j does not broadcast, the messages remain private. Another
modification of the protocol makes it possible to send m possible messages instead of just two but
note that the complexity is polynomial in m and not in the length of m. The transmission of
arbitrarily long strings is discussed in Sections 8 and 9.
6 Collision Detection
The collision detection protocol (Protocol 5) enables the participants to verify whether or not
there is a single sender in the group. This will be used as a procedure for the implementation of
anonymous message transmission in Section 9. Ideally, a protocol to detect a collision would have
as input only xi ∈ {0, 1} but unfortunately we do not know how to achieve such a functionality.
Lemma 6.1. (Reliability) No participant can make the collision detection protocol abort.
Proof. This follows from the reliability of veto.
Lemma 6.2. (Correctness) In the collision detection protocol, the output equals the output of
the ideal functionality (except with exponentially small probability).
Proof. This follows from the correctness of the veto protocol. There are only two ways a corrupt
participant can deviate from the protocol. First, participant i can set bi = 0 although xi ∈ {0, 1}
and although in the first veto his input was 1 and a collision was detected. The outcome of veto B
will still be 1 since another participant with input 1 in veto A will input 1 in veto B. This is
consistent with input xi = 1. Second, participant i can set bi = 1 although xi = 0. If veto B is
executed, then we know that another participant has input 1 in veto A. This is consistent with
input xi = 1.
Note that we have raised a subtle deviation from the ideal protocol in the above proof: we
showed how it is possible for a corrupt participant to set his input to 0 if all other participants have
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Protocol 5 Collision Detection
Input: xi ∈ {0, 1, 2}
Output: let r =
∑n
i=1 xi then yi = min{r, 2}
Broadcast type : regular broadcast
1) (Reliability) No participant can make the protocol abort.
2) (Correctness) The output of the protocol equals the output of the ideal functionality.
3) (Privacy) An adversary cannot learn more than it could have learned by assigning to all corrupt
participants the input 0 in the ideal functionality.
Veto A
All participants perform the veto protocol with inputs min{xi, 1}.
Veto B
If the outcome of veto A is 0, skip this step. Otherwise, each participant with input 1 in veto A
will set bi = 1 if he detected in veto A that another participant had input 1, or if xi = 2. All
other participants set bi = 0. Then all participants perform a second veto protocol with inputs bi.
Output: yi =


0 if the outcome of veto A is 0
1 if the outcome of veto A is 1 and the outcome of veto B is 0
2 if the outcome of veto A is 1 and the outcome of veto B is 1
input 0 and to 1 otherwise. Fortunately, the protocol is still sufficiently good for the requirements
of the following sections.
Lemma 6.3. (Privacy) In the collision detection protocol, an adversary cannot learn more than
it could have learned by assigning to all corrupt participants the input 0 in the ideal functionality.
Proof. In each veto, an adversary can only learn whether or not there exists an honest participant
with input 1. In all cases, this can be deduced from the outcome of the ideal functionality by
setting the input to be 0 for all corrupt participants.
7 Notification
In the notification protocol (Protocol 6), each participant chooses a list of other participants to
notify. The output privately reveals to each participant whether or not he was notified, but no
information on the number or origin of such notifications is revealed.
Lemma 7.1. The notification protocol achieves privacy and except with exponentially small prob-
ability, the correct output is computed.
Proof. Privacy and correctness are trivially deduced from properties of the parity protocol.
8 Fixed Role Anonymous Message Transmission
In Section 5, we presented an anonymous bit transmission protocol. The protocol easily gener-
alizes to m messages, but the complexity of the protocol becomes polynomial in m. It is not clear
how to modify the protocol to transmit a string of arbitrary length, while still allowing multiple
senders and receivers. However, in the context where a single sender S is allowed, it is possible
to implement a secure protocol for S to anonymously transmit a message to a single receiver R,
which we call fixed role anonymous message transmission (Protocol 7). If the uniqueness
condition on S and R is not satisfied, the protocol aborts. The protocol combines the use of the
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Protocol 6 Notification
Input: ∀j 6= i, xji ∈ {0, 1}
Output: yi =
∨
j 6=i x
i
j
Broadcast type : regular broadcast
1) (Correctness) If the protocol does not abort then the output of the protocol equals the output
of the ideal functionality.
2) (Privacy) The privacy is the same as in the ideal functionality.
For each participant i:
Participant i sets yi ← 0.
Repeat s times:
1. Each participant j 6= i sets the value of pj in the following way: if x
i
j = 0 then pj = 0;
otherwise, pj = 1 with probability
1
2 and pi = 0 with complimentary probability. Let pi = 0.
2. The participants execute the parity protocol with inputs p1, p2, . . . pn, with the exception
that participant i does not broadcast his value, and the simultaneous broadcast is replaced
by a regular broadcast (if any participant refuses to broadcast, abort).
3. Participant i computes the outcome of parity, and if it is 1, yi ← 1 .
parity protocol with an algebraic manipulation detection code [CFP07], which we present as The-
orem 8.1. Due to lack of space, the encoding and decoding algorithms, F and G, respectfully, are
not repeated. For a less efficient algorithm that achieves a similar result, see [PSJ99].
Theorem 8.1 ([CFP07]). There exists an efficient probabilistic encoding algorithm F : {0, 1}m →
{0, 1}m+2(log(m)+s and decoding algorithm G : {0, 1}m+2(log(m)+s) → {⊥, {0, 1}m} such that for
all w, G(F (w)) = w, and any combination of bit flips applied to w′ = F (w) produces a w′′ such
that G(w′′) =⊥, except with probability 2−s.
Lemma 8.2. (Correctness, Privacy, Oracle) In the fixed role anonymous message transmis-
sion protocol, the probability that R obtains as output a corrupt message is exponentially small.
The protocol is perfectly private, and if the oracle conditions are not satisfied, it will abort (except
with exponentially small probability).
Proof. Because of the properties of parity and the fact that the receiver broadcasts a random bit,
we have perfect privacy. Correctness is a direct consequence of Theorem 8.1. Finally, if more than
one participant acts as a sender or receiver, then again because of Theorem 8.1, the message will
not be faithfully transmitted and the protocol will abort in step 5, except with exponentially small
probability.
Theorem 8.3. For a fixed security parameter, the fixed role anonymous message transmis-
sion protocol is asymptotically optimal.
Proof. For any protocol to preserve the anonymity of the sender and the receiver, each player
must sent at least one bit to every other player for each bit of the message. In the fixed role
anonymous message transmission protocol, for a fixed s, each player actually sends O(1) bits
to each other player and therefore the protocol is asymptotically optimal.
9 Anonymous Message Transmission
Our final protocol allows a sender to anonymously transmit message to a receiver of his choosing.
Contrary to the fixed role anonymous message transmission protocol of Section 8, anony-
mous message transmission (Protocol 8) does not suppose that there is a single sender, but
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Protocol 7 Fixed Role Anonymous Message Transmission
Oracle: The sender S and receiver R know their identity
Input: S has input w ∈ {0, 1}m, all other players have no input
Output: R has output w, all other players have no output
Broadcast type : regular broadcast
1) (Correctness) If the protocol does not abort, R obtains the correct message.
2) (Privacy) The only information that can be learned through the protocol is for R to learn w.
3) (Oracle) If the oracle conditions are not satisfied (in the sense that more than one honest
participant believes to be the sender or the receiver), the protocol will abort.
1. S computes w′ = F (w)
2. The participants execute m+2(log(m) + s) rounds of the parity protocol, with participants
using a broadcast instead of a simultaneous broadcast and using the following inputs:
(a) S uses as input the bits of w′.
(b) R uses as input the bits of a random m-bit string, r.
(c) All other players use 0 as input for each round.
3. Let d be the output of the rounds of parity. R computes w′′ = d⊕ r.
4. R computes y = G(w′′).
5. A veto is performed: all players input 0 except R who inputs 1 if y =⊥ and 0 otherwise.
If the outcome of veto is 1, the protocol aborts. Otherwise, R sets his output to y.
instead, it deals with potential collisions (or lack of any sender at all) by producing the outputs
Collision or No Transmission. The only deviation from the ideal functionality in the protocol
is that a single participant can force the Collision output. Note again that in this protocol, the
privacy of the input implies anonymity of the sender and receiver.
Lemma 9.1. (Correctness) In the anonymous message transmission protocol, the output
equals the output of the ideal functionality except with exponentially small probability. The only
exception is that a single participant can make the protocol produce the output Collision.
Proof. This follows easily from the correctness of the collision detection, notification and fixed
role anonymous message transmission protocols.
Lemma 9.2. (Privacy) The anonymity of the sender and receiver are perfect. If the protocol suc-
ceeds, except with exponentially small probability, participant r is the only participant who knows w.
Proof. Perfect anonymity follows from the privacy of the collision detection, notification and
anonymous message transmission protocols. If the sender successfully notifies the receiver in
step 2, then the privacy of w is perfect. But with exponentially small probability, the receiver
will not be correctly notified, and an adversary acting as the receiver will successfully receive the
message w.
10 Conclusion
We have given six multiparty protocols that are information-theoretically secure without any as-
sumption on the number of honest participants. It would be interesting to see if the techniques we
used can be applied to other multiparty functions or in other contexts.
Our main goal was to prove the existence of several protocols in a model that does not make
use of any strong hypotheses such as computational assumptions or an honest majority. This
12
Protocol 8 Anonymous Message Transmission
Input: xi =⊥ or xi = (r, w) where r ∈ {1, . . . , n} and w ∈ {0, 1}
m
Output: If |{xi | xi 6=⊥}| = 0 then yi = No Transmission and if |{xi | xi 6=⊥}| > 1 then
yi = Collision. Otherwise let S be such that xS = (r, w) then all yi =⊥ except yr = w.
Broadcast type : regular broadcast
1) (Correctness) The output equals the output of the ideal functionality except that a single par-
ticipant can make the protocol produce the output Collision.
2) (Privacy) The privacy is the same as in the ideal functionality.
1. The participants execute the collision detection protocol; participants who have in-
put xi =⊥ use input 0 while all others use input 1. If the outcome of collision detection
is 1, continue, otherwise output No Transmission if the output is 0 and Collision if the
output is 2.
2. Let the sender S be the unique participant with xS 6=⊥. The participants execute the
notification protocol, with S using input xrS = 1 and x
j
S = 0 otherwise. All other participants
use the input bits 0. Let R be the participant who computes as output yR = 1. If the
notification protocol fails, abort.
3. The participants execute the fixed role anonymous message transmission protocol.
being said, all the presented protocols are reasonably efficient: they are all polynomial in terms of
communication and computational complexity and in one case, asymptotically optimal.
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A Proof of correctness for Protocol 3
Lemma A.1. (Correctness) If all participants are honest in the vote (Protocol 3), then the output
is correct, except with probability exponentially small in s.
Proof. We fix a value k and suppose that v participants have input xi = k. Thus we need to show
that in the vote, y[k]i = v, except with probability exponentially small in s.
We now give the intuition behind phase C of the vote. Let pv be the probability that p[k]j =⊕n
i=1 z[k]
j
i = 1. For v ≤ n, we have p0 = 0, p1 =
1
n
and pv+1 = pv
(
1− 1
n
)
+(1− pv)
1
n
. Solving this
recurrence, we get
pv =
1
2
(
n− 2
n
)v (( n
n− 2
)v
− 1
)
. (1)
Thus, the idea of phase C of the vote is for the participants to approximate pv by computing
σ[k]i =
∑s
i=1 p[k]j/s. If the approximation is within
1
2e2n
of pv, then the outcome is y[k]i = v. We
first show that if such a v exists, it is unique.
Clearly, for v < n, we have that pv+1 > pv. We also have limn→∞ pn =
1
2 −
1
2e2
. Thus the
difference between pv+1 and pv is:
pv+1 − pv = pv
(
1−
1
n
)
+ (1− p)
1
n
− pv (2)
=
1− 2pv
n
(3)
>
1− 2pn
n
(4)
>
1
e2n
(5)
Hence if such a v exists, it is unique. We now show that except with probability exponentially
small in s, the correct v will be chosen. Let X =
∑s
j=1 p[k]j be the sum of the s executions of
parity, with µ = spv the expected value of X. The participants have computed σ[k]i = X/s .
By the Chernoff bound, for any 0 < δ ≤ 1,
Pr[X ≤ (1− δ)µ] < exp(−µδ2/2) (6)
Let δ = 1
2e2npv
. We have
Pr[X ≤ µ−
s
2e2n
] < exp(−
s
8e4n2pv
) (7)
and so
Pr[σ[k]i − pv ≤
−1
2e2n
] < exp(−
s
8e4n2pv
) (8)
Similarly, still by the Chernoff bound, for any δ < 2e− 1,
Pr[X > (1 + δ)µ] < exp(−µδ2/4) (9)
Let δ = 1
2e2npv
and we get
Pr[X > µ+
s
2e2n
] < exp(
−s
16e4n2pv
) (10)
and so
Pr[σ[k]i − pv >
1
2e2n
] < exp(
−s
16e4n2pv
) (11)
Hence the protocol produces the correct value for y[k]i, except with probability exponentially
small in s.
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